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International Crimes before Dutch Courts:
Recent Developments
E L I E S VA N S L I E D R E GT∗
Abstract
In the early 1990s, two former members of the Afghan secret service applied for a residence
permit in the Netherlands. Their request was denied on the basis of the exclusion clause
of Article 1F(a) of the Vienna Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. There were
serious reasons for suspecting that the men had committed war crimes during the Afghan
civil war of 1979–92. In 2000, the immigration authorities transmitted the files of the two men
to the public prosecution office, which initiated prosecutions in 2003. At the trial, defence
counsel raised various preliminary challenges. They argued that the case should be declared
inadmissible since relying on the immigration files would violate the nemo tenetur principle
and the right against self-incrimination enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Furthermore, the court had no universal jurisdiction over violations of Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions since there was no international rule mandating a right
to universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed in non-international armed conflicts. The
Hague District Court dismissed the defence challenges and eventually convicted the Afghan
nationals to 9 and 12 years’ imprisonment. The Hague Appeal Court endorsed most of the
findings of the District Court and confirmed the convictions and sentences. The reasoning
underlying the decisions, both at first instance and at appeal, raise questions particularly with
regard to universal jurisdiction. In this article the defence arguments are explored and the
reasoning of the courts is analysed.
Key words
Afghan cases; aut dedere aut judicare; Common Article 3; Dutch courts; grave breaches; mandated
universal jurisdiction; nemo tenetur; self-incrimination; universal jurisdiction
1. INTRODUCTION
On 7 July 2000 Professor John Dugard issued his opinion in the Bouterse case before
the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam. Lieutenant-Colonel Desi Bouterse was head of
the Suriname army in December 1982, when 15 political opponents of the military
regime were tortured and killed; 14 of them were of Suriname nationality and one
was of Dutch nationality. Bouterse was thought to have played a major role in the
torture and deaths of the victims, but no prosecutions had been undertaken by
the Suriname authorities. On 20 November 2000, upon complaint filed by family
members of two of the victims, the Court of Appeal in Amsterdam ordered the
Dutch public prosecutor to initiate proceedings against Bouterse.1 The Court had
∗ Professor of Criminal Law and Procedure, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. The author wishes to thank Nico
Keijzer and Ward Ferdinandusse for their useful comments on an earlier draft.
1. Wijngaarde et al. v. Bouterse, Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, 20 November 2000, LJN: AA8395, available at
http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl. For an English translation see (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law
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sought the advice of John Dugard. One of the questions put before him was whether
customary international law as it stood in 1982 provide a basis for Dutch courts to
exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.
The Court could not have appointed a better expert to advise them on matters
concerning international law. As one of the judges on the appellate bench said,
John Dugard is of ‘undisputed authority’ and ‘a scholar of authority’.2 The Court
embraced his conclusions and ruled that torture was a crime against humanity and
that universal jurisdiction could be exercised over Bouterse, a non-national. On 18
September 2001, the Dutch Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeal, inter alia on the point of the exercise of universal jurisdiction in absentia
and for the application of the 1987 Torture Act to facts that had occurred before
its adoption in 1988.3 This was thought to be a violation of the legality principle
enshrined in Article 16 of the Dutch Constitution. The Supreme Court did not decide
any points of international law.
The Bouterse case triggered discussion in the Netherlands on the relationship
between national criminal law and international law and on the content and scope
of universal jurisdiction.4 The case was subject to debate in international legal circles
as well;5 John Dugard’s legal opinion played an important role in that debate. It is for
this reason that in this special issue, honouring John Dugard, I should like to discuss
recent developments in prosecuting international crimes before Dutch courts, more
particularly the exercise of universal jurisdiction by Dutch courts.
In the following sections recent convictions by Dutch courts for war crimes
and torture will be discussed (section 2). The focus will be on two preliminary
challenges that were put forward by the defence. One relates to the way in which the
case came before the court, via immigration procedures, and the effect that has on
the nemo tenetur principle, including the right against self-incrimination (section 3).
The second – and most important – issue concerns universal jurisdiction exercised
by Dutch courts. The article addresses the defence challenge that a right to universal
jurisdiction exists only when there is an international rule specifically authorizing
or mandating such a right (section 4).
677. For a commentary see P. J. C. Schimmelpenninck van der Oije, ‘A Surinam Case before a Dutch Court:
Post-colonial Injustice or Universal Jurisdiction?’, (2001) 14 LJIL 455. Case note by E. van Sliedregt and
N. Keijzer, (2000) 3 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 548.
2. J. H. M. Willems, ‘Treatment of Customary International Law and Use of Expert Evidence by the Dutch Court
in the Bouterse Case’, (2004) 4 Non-state Actors and International Law 64, at 73.
3. Dutch Supreme Court, 18 September 2001, LJN AB1471, available at http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl. For an English
translation see (2001) 4 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 710; and case note by N. Keijzer in (2001)
4 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 595.
4. See W. N. Ferdinandusse, J. K. Kleffner, and P. A. Nollkaemper, ‘Origineel of reproductie? Internationale
strafbaarstellingen in de Nederlandse rechtsorde’, (2002) Nederlands Juristenblad 341; G. A. M. Strijards,
‘Neerlands dualisme en zijn strafmacht’, (2000) Nederlands Juristenblad 2113.
5. See for instance the opinions of some of the ICJ judges in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, 14 February 2002, [2002] ICJ Rep. 3 (Arrest Warrant
Case), in particular at 172 (Judge van den Wyngaert, Dissenting Opinion), at 70 (Judges Higgins, Kooijmans,
and Buergenthal, Joint Separate Opinion), and at 42 (Judge Guillaume, Separate Opinion); see also L. Reydams,
Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives (2003), 173.
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2. THE CASES AGAINST TWO AFGHAN GENERALS
On 14 October 2005, The Hague District Court rendered (separate but related) judg-
ments convicting two Afghan nationals, former members of the Afghan military
intelligence service (Khad), for torturing civilians in the period 1985–90, during the
Afghan civil war of 1978–92.6 H, the former head of the Khad, filed an application for
asylum upon arrival in the Netherlands in 1992. J, former head of the interrogations
department of the Khad, filed an application in 1996. H’s request was denied, while
refugee status was granted to J but withdrawn later. The immigration authorities
determined that with regard to both men there were serious reasons for considering
that they had committed war crimes, or crimes against humanity. This ground of
refusal, also known as the ‘exclusion clause’ of Article 1F(a) of the Vienna Conven-
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees, was relied upon to deny the men a residence
permit and a right to reside in the Netherlands. During questioning by immigration
authorities the two men had provided what later turned out to be incriminating
evidence. In 2000, the immigration authorities transmitted the immigration files to
the public prosecution office, which initiated prosecutions against the two Afghan
nationals in 2003.
The most interesting legal issues arose in the context of preliminary challenges
raised by the defence; two of which will be discussed in more detail below. Defence
counsel argued that the cases were inadmissible because the nemo tenetur principle –
the principle whereby no one can be forced to contribute to his or her own conviction
or criminal responsibility, which includes the right against self-incrimination – was
violated. With that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
was violated. The defence further disputed the exercise of universal jurisdiction
over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, since there was no
international rule obliging, or at least mandating, the exercise of such jurisdiction.
The District Court rejected the preliminary challenges and convicted and sentenced
the two generals to 12 and nine years’ imprisonment respectively.
On 29 January 2007, The Hague Court of Appeal delivered its judgment in both
cases.7 The Court endorsed most of the District Court’s findings and confirmed the
guilty verdicts and sentences.
3. NEMO TENETUR AND ARTICLE 1F PROCEEDINGS
The District Court dismissed the defence challenge that there had been a violation
of the nemo tenetur principle and the right against self-incrimination. The Court
held that since the statements had not been obtained with a view to determining a
criminal charge the nemo tenetur principle was not violated. The interview had had
6. The Hague District Court, 14 October 2005, LJN AU4373; The Hague District Court, 14 October 2005, LJN:
AU4347, both are available at http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl.
7. The Hague Court of Appeal, 29 January 2007, LJN: AZ7147; The Hague Court of Appeal, 29 January 2007,
LJN: AZ7143, available at http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl. One of the cases is available on the ‘international law in
domestic courts’ database at http://ildc.oxfordlawreports.com as H v. Public Prosecutor, Court of Appeal of The
Hague, ILDC 636 (NL 2007).
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no other purpose than to establish whether a residence permit should be issued.
Moreover, the Court found that when the accused applied for a residence permit and
answered questions put to him by immigration authorities, there was no ‘criminal
charge’ as under Article 6 ECHR.
The reasoning of the Court is not persuasive. Is it really relevant that at the time
of the interviews there was no criminal charge? In the case of Saunders the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that the protection of the right against self-
incrimination also covers the period before there is a ‘criminal charge’.8 It is further
noteworthy that the District Court deemed it relevant that the immigration staff
did not foresee that the answers to their questions would be used in a criminal trial.
Should we take from this that sincere or correct information gathering in the pre-
trial phase guarantees compliance with the nemo tenetur principle? Again, Saunders
seems to point to a different conclusion: correct or sincere information gathering
in the non-criminal pre-trial phase may still lead to a violation of the right against
self-incrimination in a subsequent criminal proceeding.
Mettraux, in a commentary to the judgments, criticizes the District Court’s
decisions on this point.9 He argues that the essence of the right against self-
incrimination, and the nemo tenetur principle, is the perception of the accused, not
‘the perception which the immigration official might have had at the time about
the (im-)possibility of criminal proceedings arising out of those files’.10 His criticism
is legitimate with regard to the Court’s reliance on Saunders, but it does not hold as
a general statement. In another ECtHR case, the case of Weh, an official’s attitude
and intention was indeed considered relevant in deciding whether there was a viol-
ation of the nemo tenetur principle. The European Court held that the complainant’s
right not to incriminate himself was not violated since there was no concrete threat
of criminal prosecution when he provided information to the authorities.11 The
threat of criminal prosecution, which may be used to put pressure on a person who
is being questioned, was thought to amount to pressure that could violate nemo
tenetur. With a view to Weh the attitude of the immigration officer may indeed be
important in determining whether improper pressure has been applied. The closer
the link between asylum proceedings and a criminal prosecution, the greater the
pressure on the accused, and the greater the likelihood that the nemo tenetur prin-
ciple is violated. Since the defence in these cases did not substantiate in any way that
at the time of the interviews there was an indication that criminal investigations
would be initiated against their clients, and because of the fact that four to eight
years had passed between the time of the interview and the transfer of the files, it is
submitted that the defence arguments were rightly dismissed by the District Court.
The Appeals Court endorsed the District Court ruling. It held that since there was no
8. Saunders v. United Kingdom, Decision of 17 December 1996, ECHR Reports 1997-III, 691.
9. G. Mettraux, ‘Dutch Courts’ Universal Jurisdiction over Violations of Common Article 3 qua War Crimes’,
(2006) Journal of International Criminal Justice 362.
10. Ibid., at 365.
11. Weh v. Austria, Decision of 8 April 2004, ECHR appl. no. 38544/97 (not yet published). Weh was asked to
disclose the name of the person driving the car that was registered in his name. A refusal to disclose such
information was met with the threat of an administrative fine.
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link between immigration and criminal proceedings no relevant pressure had been
applied.12
Nowadays the immigration authorities and the prosecution services co-operate
closely. While both services already in 1997 expressed the intention to intensify
their co-operation in pursuing a strict ‘1F policy’, it was not until 2002 that this
really commenced. Plans have been made to increase the criminal-law expertise of
immigration officials, to ensure that police are present at immigration interviews,
and to post a criminal lawyer permanently at the immigration services.13 It seems
that in recent years the immigration- and criminal-law spheres have been brought
closer together. Some have expressed the fear that the 1F procedure will develop
into a pre-trial quasi criminal procedure.14 This close co-operation would deprive of
all force the arguments put forward by the District Court and the Court of Appeal
on the point of nemo tenetur, at least for more recent prosecutions that stem from 1F
proceedings.
Both the District Court and the Court of Appeal unequivocally dismissed the
defence argument that the statements of the accused before immigration officials
have been made under pressure because they were forced to leave their country
and seek residence elsewhere. The District Court held that no one is forced to
apply for a residence permit in the Netherlands and that both accused voluntarily
subjected themselves to the procedure of interviews. It is submitted that the Courts
were right in dismissing the defence argument, not because there was a complete
lack of pressure but because the pressure to respond to questions stemmed from
the necessity to escape from Afghanistan rather than the attitude of the Dutch
authorities. This is pressure that does not affect the right not to incriminate oneself,
as protected by the nemo tenetur principle and Article 6 ECHR.15 The fact that a person
seeking access to the Netherlands may feel forced to co-operate with the authorities
to achieve this goal does not mean that he or she is under the type of pressure that
is relevant in determining whether nemo tenetur has been violated.
4. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
4.1. The District Court judgment
The issue that has been discussed most vigorously, in and outside the court room,16
concerns the exercise of universal jurisdiction. In the case of H, the defence
12. See H v. Public Prosecutor, supra note 7, para. 6.2.6.
13. ‘Evaluatie Plan van Aanpak opsporing en vervolging oorlogsmisdrijven (Evaluatie Plan van Aanpak)’, Ad-
dendum to Kamerstukken II 2005/2006, 30300 VII, nr. 119, at 61. See ‘Aanwijzing afdoening aangiften m.b.t.
de strafbaarstellingen in de Wet internationale misdrijven’, Staatscourant, 22 December 2003, no. 247.
14. See the report by the Nederlands Juristen Comité voor de Mensenrechten (NJCM; the Dutch branch of the
International Commission of Jurists), ‘Commentaar betreffende de toepassing van artikel 1F Vluchtelin-
genverdrag en de bestrijding van terrorisme’, 11 June 2002 and ‘Evaluatie Plan van Aanpak’, supra note 13,
58–59.
15. For a different view see Mettraux, supra note 9, at 365.
16. The District Court judgments started a polemic in the Journal of International Criminal Justice between Mettraux,
Zegveld, and Ferdinandusse. See Mettraux, supra note 9, 362–71; L. Zegveld, ‘Dutch Cases on Torture Com-
mitted in Afghanistan: The Relevance of the Distinction between Internal and International Armed Con-
flict’, (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 878; W. N. Ferdinandusse, ‘On the Question of Dutch
Courts’ Universal Jurisdiction. A response to Mettraux’, (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 881;
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challenged the District Court’s jurisdiction by arguing that it lacked universal juris-
diction over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Common
Article 3, which applies in situations of non-international armed conflict, does
not provide for an aut iudicare aut dedere clause17 as does paragraph 2 common to
Articles 49/50/129/146 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (the so-called grave breaches
provisions) that apply in international armed conflicts. The latter clause implies the
establishment of universal jurisdiction.18 Reasoning a contrario, the defence argued
that as a result Common Article 3 does not provide for universal jurisdiction. What
underlies the defence argument is the understanding that exercising universal juris-
diction requires an explicit authorization or mandate under international law. Since
(i) no such rule exists under international law with regard to violations of Common
Article 3, and (ii) a national provision – such as Article 8, read together with Art-
icle 3, of the Dutch War Crimes Act criminalizing war crimes in general terms and
providing for jurisdiction over such crimes – is not sufficient as a basis for universal
jurisdiction, the case should be declared inadmissible.
The District Court dismissed the defence argument. It held that the fact that
there exists an obligation to prosecute grave breaches does not preclude states from
establishing universal jurisdiction over other violations of international humanit-
arian law. In other words, what is not obliged may still be permitted. In arriving at
this conclusion the judges relied on paragraph 3 common to Articles 49/50/129/146
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which stipulates that states shall ‘take measures
necessary for the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the present
convention other than the grave breaches’ (emphasis added). The judges held that
such measures can be of a criminal nature.
This part of the ruling has been rightly criticized.19 The District Court failed to
distinguish between a state’s authority to criminalize certain conduct, on the one
hand, and a state’s right to adjudicate such conduct, on the other hand. Or, in the
words of O’Keefe, between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce.20 The
District Court justified exercising universal jurisdiction over violations of Common
Article 3 through the suppression clause of paragraph 3 of the grave breaches pro-
visions. However, the fact that the Geneva Conventions authorize the suppression
of violations of Common Article 3 does not eo ipso mean that a Dutch judge has
universal jurisdiction over such violations.
G. Mettraux, ‘Responses to the Comments by Zegveld and Ferdinandusse’, (2006) 4 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 884.
17. The more common way of referring to such an obligation is aut dedere aut judicare, or ‘extradite or adjudicate’.
In the Geneva Conventions the order is reversed. Article 49(2) GCI reads: ‘Each High Contracting Party shall
be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have ordered to be committed,
such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It
may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over
for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such High Contracting Party has made out
a “prima facie” case’.
18. See R. van Elst, ‘Implementing Universal Jurisdiction over Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions’, (2000)
13 LJIL 819.
19. See Mettraux, supra note 9, at 367; Zegveld, supra note 16, at 879.
20. R. O’Keefe, ‘Universal Jurisdiction. Clarifying the Basic Concept’, (2004) 2 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 735, at 736.
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4.2. The Court of Appeal judgment
At appeal, the Court of Appeal addressed the question raised by the defence and
left unanswered by the District Court: does the Dutch War Crimes Act provide a
sufficient basis for exercising universal jurisdiction? In raising this question the
defence repeated its claim that the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national
courts requires a written or unwritten international rule mandating such exercise.
The Court answered the question in the affirmative: the Dutch War Crimes Act
does constitute a sufficient basis for establishing universal jurisdiction. The Court put
forward two reasons. The first reason was the purpose to end impunity. This had been
one of the main reasons for the Dutch legislature to establish universal jurisdiction
over torture in the act implementing the 1984 UN Convention against Torture.21 As
the deliberations laid down in the Explanatory Memorandum to the 1987 Torture
Act go to show, the legislature felt the need to prevent torturers from travelling freely
to countries where they could confront their victims who had fled abroad. The Court
held that the same goal might be served by exercising universal jurisdiction under
the War Crimes Act. The second reason was found in the wording of Article 3, the
chapeau, and under subsection 1 of the War Crimes Act, that unreservedly stipulates
that there is jurisdiction over the war crimes listed in Articles 8 and 9 of the War
Crimes Act.22
This is only half the answer. So far the Court merely referred to national law in
responding to the defence challenge on universal jurisdiction. It did not explain
whether, and if so which, international rule(s) permit(s) the exercise of universal
jurisdiction under Article 3 of the War Crimes Act. Nor did it address the defence
argument that such authorization is required. Instead – and here the judgment takes
a surprising turn – the Court dismissed the defence argument on constitutional
grounds. The Court (re)interpreted the defence challenge as claiming that custom-
ary international law prohibits the exercise of universal jurisdiction over violations
of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Since Article 94 of the Dutch
Constitution, read a contrario, stipulates that customary international law that con-
flicts with national statutory law is not applicable in the Dutch legal order,23 the
Court declared itself not competent to rule on the matter.24 It found that it was not
competent to determine whether Article 3 of the War Crimes Act is in conformity
with international law. This is a somewhat unsatisfactory ruling. It seems that the
Court steered itself into a ‘not competent position’ by translating the defence’s claim
on the absence of an international law mandate into the presence of an international
law prohibition, a rule of customary international law that prohibits the exercise of
universal jurisdiction. This is a subtle difference, but one that leads straight to the
constitutional limitation of Article 94. After all, had the Court found that there was
21. H v. Public Prosecutor, supra note 7, para. 5.2.3.
22. ‘Regardless the stipulations in the Penal Code and the Military Penal Code, the Dutch penal legislation
applies: 1◦ to anyone who committed a crime outside the Kingdom in Europe as described in articles 8 and
9’. Translation by ILDC. See ILDC 636 (NL 2007), para. 5.2.3.
23. As interpreted in case law (the case of Nyugat), Dutch Supreme Court, 6 March 1959, (1962) Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie 2.
24. See H v. Public Prosecutor, supra note 7, para. 5.4.1.
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a customary rule permitting, or even specifically mandating, a right to assert and
exercise universal jurisdiction, there would have been no obstacle to applying it in
the Dutch legal order.
In concluding its decision, the Appeal Court referred to the Knežević judgment
before the Dutch Supreme Court.25 In Knežević, the Supreme Court held that a
foreign asylum-seeker could be prosecuted in the Netherlands for war crimes com-
mitted during a non-international armed conflict (namely the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia), even if it concerned a conflict in which the Netherlands was not involved
as a party. The Supreme Court found that the Dutch legislature, when drafting the
War Crimes Act, intended to comply fully with its obligations under the Geneva
Conventions, admittedly first and foremost with regard to the grave breaches, yet it
appears from parliamentary debate at the time that it did not exclude the possibility
of exercising jurisdiction over crimes committed in non-international armed con-
flicts as well. The Court of Appeal adopted this reasoning in dismissing the defence
challenge with regard to universal jurisdiction.
4.3. Mandated, permitted, or prohibited universal jurisdiction?
The question remains: is the exercise of universal jurisdiction by a Dutch court
over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions permitted under
international law? Is it true, as defence counsel maintained, that the exercise of
universal jurisdiction requires a mandate under international law? These questions
go the heart of the debate and controversies surrounding the concept of universal
jurisdiction. Much has been written about universal jurisdiction and many views
exist as to its scope and meaning. This is not the place to discuss these views at length
but the following observations can be made.
The defence claimed that a right to universal jurisdiction requires an inter-
national rule specifically mandating this. This position is different from the view
that asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction is lawful as long as there is no inter-
national rule prohibiting it. The latter position is the rule emanating from the Lotus
decision of 1927 by the Permanent Court of International Justice, a case in which
France complained about Turkey’s exercise of criminal jurisdiction over the French
captain of a vessel that had collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas and had
caused Turkish casualties.26 The judges in Lotus held that ‘Restrictions upon the
independence of states cannot be presumed.’ The court held that states have a right
25. Dutch Supreme Court, 11 November 1997, (1998) Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 463; for an English translation
of the case see (1998) 1 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 601 with note by N. Keijzer. See further
Reydams, supra note 5, at 171; R. van Elst, ‘De zaak Darco Knezevic; rechtsmacht over Joegoslavische en
andere buitenlandse oorlogsmisdadigers’, (1998) Nederlands Juristen Blad 1587.
26. SS Lotus case (France v. Turkey), [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A, No. 10, at 4. The Court held that ‘The first and foremost
restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the existence of a permissive rule to
the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory of another state’. However, the Court
continues, ‘it does not . . . follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its
own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it
cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law’, and, further on, ‘far from laying down a general
prohibition to the effect that states may not extend the application of their laws and jurisdiction of their
courts to persons . . . outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion which
is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules’. Ibid., at 19.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Apr 2011 IP address: 130.37.129.78
I N T E R NAT I O NA L C R I M E S B E F O R E DU TC H C OU RT S: R E C E N T D EV E LO P M E N T S 903
to assert jurisdiction as long as it is not prohibited by an international convention or
custom. This ‘presumptive freedom of state action’ – to use Reydams’s words27 – is
controversial and has sparked debate amongst international and criminal lawyers.
The Lotus test is regarded as too liberal, given the growing complexity of the present-
day international legal order. This criticism can be countered, on the other hand, by
arguing that the ‘Lotus freedom’ is not unlimited. The decision itself refers to ‘[t]he
limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its
title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty’.28
The concept of universal jurisdiction appears in different shapes and forms and
various (sub)categories have been distinguished in legal doctrine.29 No agreed defin-
ition exists, and scholars tend to rely on a negative definition – defining universal
jurisdiction by stipulating what it is not. It is jurisdiction over conduct that cannot
be linked to a state’s territory, the offender’s or victim’s nationality, or protection of
certain state interests. In the words of O’Keefe it is ‘prescriptive jurisdiction in the
absence of any other recognized jurisdictional nexus’.30
The various forms of universal jurisdiction represent the evolution of the concept
over time, which is a development from a co-operative universal jurisdiction over
all serious crimes to universal jurisdiction for a limited class of international crimes.
The latter has been referred to as ‘unilateral universal jurisdiction’,31 ‘pure universal
jurisdiction’,32 or ‘true universal jurisdiction’.33 This evolution explains why some
scholars are sceptical about applying Lotus to present-day universal jurisdiction.
Since Nuremberg, universal jurisdiction has evolved into a concept with a specific
purpose: ending impunity and not letting international crimes go unpunished. The
establishment of international criminal tribunals and the adoption of international
conventions criminalizing heinous acts such as genocide and war crimes have made
universal jurisdiction a distinctive feature of a category of international crimes. It
is for this reason that the members of the seventeenth commission of the Institut
de Droit International, in adopting a resolution on universal jurisdiction,34 and
scholars such as Kress35 reject the validity of the Lotus decision as a basis for universal
jurisdiction over international crimes. Nevertheless, there are also those who hold
27. Reydams, supra note 5, at 13.
28. Lotus case, supra note 26, at 18–19.
29. Universal jurisdiction may be a form of legal co-operation and as such confined by requiring either a link with
the forum state or a connection with extradition. This form has been referred to as ‘co-operative universal
jurisdiction’ or jurisdiction stemming from the ‘representation principle’. Universal jurisdiction may be a
unilateral claim for jurisdiction on behalf of the international community and as such no longer requiring a
link with the forum state. It may be ‘limited universal jurisdiction’ by only regarding international crimes.
And it may be ‘general universal jurisdiction’ applying to all serious offences that are punishable in most
legal systems. See Reydams, supra note 5, at 28–43.
30. See O’Keefe, supra note 20, at 744. See also Reydams, supra note 5, at 5: ‘“universal jurisdiction” means that
a State, without seeking to protect its security or credit, seeks to punish conduct irrespective of the place
where it occurs, the nationality of the perpetrator, and the nationality of the victim’.
31. Reydams, supra note 5, at 38–42.
32. Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, Commentary at 42, available at http://www1.umn.
edu/humanrts/instree/princeton.html.
33. C. Kress, ‘Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International’, (2006) 4
Journal of International Criminal Justice 561, at 572.
34. The resolution is available at http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/navig_chon2003.html.
35. Kress, supra note 33, at 572.
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that Lotus is still valid. In the Arrest Warrant case, Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and
Buerghenthal in their Joint and Separate Opinion,36 and Judge Van den Wyngaert in
her Dissenting Opinion,37 rely on Lotus as a basis for a permissive international rule
on universal jurisdiction.
This author agrees with the latter position; Lotus can be a basis for universal
jurisdiction, first of all because the Lotus decision is still the only international
decision regarding a state’s right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction and, second,
because state practice evidences the popularity of the Lotus decision. As Reydams
points out, the fact that states have been reluctant to adopt a global convention on
criminal jurisdiction (where such instruments do exist with regard to jurisdiction in
civil and commercial matters), that domestic jurisdictions have endorsed the Lotus
decision in asserting universal jurisdiction over international crimes, and the fact
that states generally refrain from referring jurisdictional issues to the ICJ can all be
taken as evidence for the continuing popularity of the Lotus decision in the ambit of
pure universal jurisdiction.38
The Lotus decision cannot, however, be the sole basis for universal jurisdiction; it is
a minimum requirement that requires support from (an)other permissive rule(s). As-
serting universal jurisdiction over international crimes requires first of all linking it
to international rules comprising universal values. As Kress submits, ‘it is impossible
for a state to unilaterally call into being a fundamental international community
value that it can then protect through the existence of universal jurisdiction’.39
While such values are often codified in conventional law, universal jurisdiction
rarely is, hence the importance of customary international law.40 Bearing in mind
that universal jurisdiction does not exist by way of the criminalization of conduct
at the international level,41 identification of a permissive rule in (customary) inter-
national law, or at least a positive predisposition in state practice, is still necessary.
This is not the same as requiring a rule specifically mandating universal jurisdiction.
That would go against the Lotus principle of presumptive freedom. And here we
return to the cases of the two Afghan generals.
Accepting the validity of the Lotus decision implies, first of all, rejecting the defence
claim of mandated universal jurisdiction. Moreover, as a requirement additional to
Lotus, a rule must be identified permitting universal jurisdiction over violations
of Common Article 3 – that is, war crimes committed in non-international armed
36. See supra note 5, para. 50.
37. Ibid., para. 48.
38. Reydams, supra note 5, at 14–17, 161–3 and 216–17, referring to H. Fox, ‘Jurisdiction and Immunities’, in
V. Lowe and M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice (1996), 210 at 212–15, the
Eichmann case before the Supreme Court of Israel and the Demanjuk case before a US federal court.
39. Kress, supra note 33, at 572, referring to C. Maierhöfer, Aut dedere – aut judicare. Herkunft, Rechtsgrundlagen und
Inhalt des völkerrechtlichen Gebotes zur Strafverfolgung oder Auslieferung (2006), at 41 ff.
40. The Genocide Convention provides for territorial jurisdiction, which is ‘extended’ to universal jurisdiction
in a number of domestic statutes and court decisions, thus making the Convention’s jurisdictional clause a
‘minimum rule’. See the recent decision of the ECtHR, Jorgic v. Germany, 12 July 2007, appl. no. 74613/01. See
also practice of Australia, Austria, Canada, Belgium, France, Israel, and Switzerland as discussed by Reydams,
supra note 5.
41. States may be in favour of denouncing certain conduct as international crimes yet deny the exercise of
universal jurisdiction over it for the fear of politically motivated trials and prefer international adjudication.
See Kress, supra note 33, at 572.
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conflicts. It is this last question that has been left unanswered by the Court of Appeal
for reasons set out above.
In answering this question, it should be emphasized that the fact that there is
no provision in the Geneva Conventions obliging states to extradite or adjudicate
(aut dedere aut judicare) violations of Common Article 3 does not in any way detract
from the existence of a rule permitting universal jurisdiction over such violations.
In other words, the lack of an obligation in treaty law to prosecute, implying universal
jurisdiction,42 does not preclude (i) the existence of a right to assert universal juris-
diction under customary international law, or (ii) the existence of a customary aut
dedere aut judicare rule with regard to crimes committed in non-international armed
conflicts. Substantiating both assumptions as valid can be done only by relying on
customary international law, which may essentially be deduced from ‘verbal’ state
practice and the deduction of principles.43
Indications for a customary permissive rule can, first of all, be found in national
statutory law providing for universal jurisdiction over war crimes committed in
non-international armed conflicts44 and national decisions stemming from prosecu-
tions for such crimes.45 Second, the Statutes of the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) provide for jurisdiction
over violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, in Articles 3
and 4 respectively. As these instruments stipulate that Tribunals have concurrent
jurisdiction (Art. 8/9(1) ICTR/Y Statute) and states are under a duty to co-operate
(Art. 28/28(1) ICTR/Y Statute) these provisions implicitly force states to establish
universal jurisdiction over such crimes. A third indicator for a permissive rule can
be found in the landmark ruling of the ICTY in Tadić that violations of Common
Article 3 are crimes under international criminal law which entail individual crim-
inal responsibility.46 Tadić is not only relevant for adjudication at the international
level; we are reminded here of the ‘completion strategy’ and the referral of cases by
the ICTY and the ICTR to domestic courts and the practice of referral of cases by
the ICTY and ICTR to domestic courts. Such courts are expected to have universal
jurisdiction over violations of Common Article 3. Finally, the members of the 17th
Commission of the Institut de Droit International agree in paragraph 3(a) of the
Resolution that ‘universal jurisdiction may be exercised over crimes identified by
international law as falling within that jurisdiction in matters such as genocide,
crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the
42. Van Elst, supra note 18, at 819–25.
43. See Kress, supra note 33, at 573–6, where he convincingly argues that the existence of a permissive inter-
national legal rule may be deduced from the categorization by states of conduct as an international crime.
This ‘verbal’ state practice test suffices instead of the precise ‘hard’ state practice of the Continental Shelf case.
44. For instance the Belgian Law relating to the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian
Law (Art. 7) or the Swiss Code Pénal Militaire (Art. 108(2)) and since 1998 legislation giving effect to
obligations under the ICC Statute (Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom). See further Reydams, supra note
5, at 81–220 and Maierhöfer, supra note 39, at 196–221.
45. See infra the Danish Sarić case before the Højesteret, 15 August 1995; the Belgian Higaniro et al. case before the
Assize Court of Brussels, 8 June 2001; and the Swiss case of Niyonteze before the Tribunal militaire d’appel 1A
Geneva, 26 May 2000. See further Reydams, supra note 5, at 81–220 and Maierhöfer, supra note 39, at 196–221.
46. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94–1,
A.Ch., 2 October 1995, paras. 128–34.
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protection of war victims or other serious violations of international humanitarian law
committed in international or non-international armed conflict’ (emphasis added). This is
far from an exhaustive list of ‘indicators’. However, taken together, they do provide
‘proof’ of the existence of a permissive rule.
Is the above also proof for a permissive rule in the period 1985–90, the time of the
crimes in the Afghan cases? In a recent study Maierhöfer suggests that a customary
law aut dedere aut judicare rule has emerged with regard to war crimes committed in
non-international armed conflicts.47 His thorough analysis of extradition practice
and domestic prosecutions provides evidence for the existence of an obligation to
prosecute such violations on an equal footing with prosecuting grave breaches.48
When it can be established that there is nowadays an obligation in customary interna-
tional criminal law to prosecute war crimes committed in non-international armed
conflicts, it is not hard to accept that previously, at the time of the crimes committed
by the Afghan generals, there was a right under customary international criminal
law to assert universal jurisdiction over such crimes. At this point we are reminded
of the ICRC’s study on customary international humanitarian law, in particular the
commentary to Rule 157 that
The right of States to vest universal jurisdiction in their national courts over war
crimes in no way diminishes the obligation of States party to the Geneva Conventions
and States party to Additional Protocol I to provide for universal jurisdiction in their
national legislation over those war crimes known as ‘grave breaches’.49
This leaves us to conclude that the defence argument with regard to universal
jurisdiction can also be dismissed as untenable from an international law perspect-
ive.
5. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The Afghan cases constitute the second successful prosecution in the Netherlands
on the basis of universal jurisdiction after the Knežević case. In 2004 the District
Court of Rotterdam convicted and sentenced a former member of the Congolese
Garde Civile for torture committed in what was then known as Zaire.50 That case
marked the first successful prosecution in the Netherlands on the basis of universal
jurisdiction. What these three cases have in common is that they all ensue from
an asylum procedure. They are the result of the transfer of files by the immigration
authorities to the prosecution service.
47. See supra note 39.
48. Maierhöfer, supra note 39, at 196–221, where he refers to Danish, French, German, Dutch, Swiss, and Belgian
practice.
49. J. M. Henckaerts and L. Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law (2005), Vol. I (Rules),
Rule 157, at 606 (emphasis added).
50. Rotterdam District Court, 7 April 2004, LJN: AO7178, available at http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl. See for a com-
mentary W. N. Ferdinandusse, ‘Prosecutor v. N.: Case No. AO7178‘, at http://www.rechtspraak.nl, translated at
(2004) 51 Netherlands International Law Review 439, at 444; ‘Rotterdam District Court, April 7, 2004, Prosecutor
v. N.’, (2005) 99 AJIL 686; M. Kamminga, ‘First Conviction under the Universal Jurisdiction Provisions of the
UN Convention against Torture: Rotterdam District Court’, (2004) 51 Netherlands International Law Review
439.
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Soon after the Afghan cases two more prosecutions for international crimes
followed. This time it concerned Dutch nationals who, by doing business with
the regimes of Saddam Hussein and Charles Taylor, were prosecuted for com-
plicity in international crimes.51 These cases are illustrative of a more ‘proact-
ive’ approach in investigating international crimes. Dutch police announced that
sources other than immigration files – for instance non-governmental organization
(NGO) reports and intelligence provided by the national security service (AIVD) –
would be looked into and used as ‘start-information’ for building up a case.52 This
might prevent any more nemo tenetur challenges in the future. Other problems,
however, remain. For instance, the search for evidence of crimes that have been
committed sometimes more than 20 years ago. Recently an Afghan asylum seeker
was acquitted of charges of war crimes since there was no (reliable) evidence link-
ing him to the torture of civilians.53 This decision illustrates the complications of
prosecuting international crimes. In exercising his or her prosecutorial discretion,
the prosecutor will have to make sure that the evidentiary threshold for starting
prosecutions in cases that go back 15 to 20 years is met.54 It is, therefore, not to be
expected that in the future Dutch courts will be overwhelmed with cases like the
Afghan cases.
Having said that, an interesting development has recently taken place that may
bring more international crimes cases to domestic courts in The Hague after all. On
13 April 2007 an ICTR trial chamber in Prosecutor v. Michel Bagaragaza ordered the
case to be referred to the authorities of the Netherlands.55 The Dutch Minister of
Justice, in a ‘note verbale’ dated 11 December 2006, expressed his willingness to take
over the Bagaragaza case. Not long before that, in a letter dated 3 November 2006,
the Dutch government was requested by the ICTR prosecutor to accept transfer of
yet another case. These developments illustrate that in implementing the ICTR’s
‘Completion Strategy’,56 requiring all first-instance cases to be completed by 2010,
the ICTR prosecutor is actively pursuing a policy of referring cases to Dutch courts.
A recent decision by a Dutch court may have put a halt to, or at least have delayed,
this anticipated transfer of proceedings.
On 24 July 2007 the District Court in The Hague held that Dutch courts have no
jurisdiction – universal jurisdiction on the basis of the representation principle – over
51. Frans van A. was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for complicity in war crimes (The Hague District
Court, 23 December 2005, LJN: AU 8685 and The Hague Court of Appeal, 9 May 2007, LJN: BA6734 (English
translation), all available at http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl). For a commentary see H. G. van der Wilt, ‘Genocide,
Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic Jurisdiction: Reflections on the van Anraat Case’,
(2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 239. Guus van K. was sentenced to eight years for violating an
international embargo (arms trade) and acquitted of war crimes (The Hague District Court, 7 June 2006, LJN
AX 7098, available at http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl).
52. ‘Evaluatie Plan van Aanpak’, supra note 13, at 63.
53. The Hague District Court, 25 June 2006, LJN: BA7877, available at http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl.
54. See the policy document of the Public Prosecution Office stipulating that there is evidence that warrants
a sufficient and realistic perspective for a successful prosecution within a reasonable time: ‘Aanwijzing
afdoening aangiften m.b.t. de strafbaarstellingen in de Wet internationale misdrijven’, supra note 13, at 11,
paras. 3.1.1–3.1.3.
55. Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Decision on Prosecutor’s request for referral of the indictment to the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, Case No. ICTR 2005–86-11bis, T.Ch.III, 13 April 2007.
56. Adopted pursuant to deadlines set by the UN Security Council in Resolutions 1503 (2003) and 1534 (2004).
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crimes committed by a Rwandan national in Rwanda in 1994.57 In a well-motivated
and carefully drafted decision the Court held that the transfer of proceedings from
the ICTR to the Netherlands requires either a specific treaty provision or a specific
statutory basis. The decision may be welcomed for doing justice to the ‘closed’
nature of the Dutch jurisdictional system of Dutch law – as already appeared from
Bouterse58 – and by recognizing the distinction in Dutch law between a co-operation
regime on the basis of a general treaty provision (UN Charter taken together with
the ICTY and ICTR Statutes) and a co-operation regime that requires a more specific
basis. The former applies to surrender of the accused and the transfer of evidence
to the Tribunal, the latter applies to the execution of Tribunal sentences and would
also apply to the transfer of proceedings from the Tribunal. While the reasoning
of the court is persuasive in systemizing and rationalizing the Dutch jurisdictional
and co-operation scheme, it does, however, beg the question why the legislature
never bothered to provide for a specific basis for transfer of proceedings59 when the
Dutch minister of justice seems to be more than keen to take over some of the ICTR’s
workload.
International criminal law is a fast developing field of law. Much has changed
since John Dugard issued his Opinion in the Bouterse case. The Suriname authorities
are currently preparing the trial of Bouterse in Suriname, before a military court.
More than ever states are made aware of their responsibilities in ending impunity.
John Dugard has played, and will continue to play, an important role in raising such
awareness and we thank him for that.
57. The Hague District Court, 24 July 2007, LJN: BB0494 available at http://ljn.rechtspraak.nl.
58. See paras. 4.1–4.8 of the Dutch Supreme Court decision in Bouterse, and paras. 16, 17, and 69 of Advocate-
General Keijzer, supra note 3.
59. After all, referral is regulated in Rule 11 bis of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE), providing for
‘referral states’ to take over a case. A similar provision can be found in the ICTY RPE.
